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1  Introduct i on
Far mi ng i s r i sky,   i n t he sense t hat   out com es are str ongl y aff ected by unpredictable
exogenous factors beyond t he cont r ol  of farme r s. Especiall y i n poor econom ies, wh e r e
f arme r s have  l i t t l e access t o  devel oped  i nsurance and  credit   ma r ket s,  r i sk pl ays a centr al  r ol e
bot h i n t he choi ce of crop m i x and i n t he i nst i t ut i onal  arr angem ent s in agri cult ure, wh i ch
aff ect  product i vi t y and we l f are.  The  m easurem ent  of  r i sk,  how ever,   i s di f f i cult ,   because we
seldom   have  t he  ki nd  of  det ail ed observat i ons  t hat   w oul d  all ow   us  t o  separate t he  i m pacts of
i nfl uences  such as w eather,   f arme r s’  skil l s,  access t o  ot her  i nput s,  bi ol ogi cal  f actors,  and  t he
l i ke.  Thi s paper is int ended as a fi r st part  of a larger proj ect to m easure ri sk in a pre-
i ndust r i al  agri cult ure.  The  chosen area,  t he centr al  I t ali an r egion of  Tuscany before Wo r l d
Wa r  I,  is ri ch in l ong t erm a g r i cult ural dat a, because it s tenure system , sharecroppi ng,
r equi r ed detail ed account s, m any of wh i ch have survi ved.  The quest i on w e are asking,  at
t hi s stage,  i s simp l e:  wh a t   wa s   t he l evel  of  r i sk f aced by f arme r s i n a Me d i t err anean area?
Ho w  mi ght   t hi s have  aff ected i nst i t ut i ons  and  crop  mi x?
2  Background  and  Da t a
I n  t hi s secti on  we   provi de  som e background  i n  order  t o  pl ace our  dat a i n  a hi stori cal
cont ext,  fi r st presenti ng t he debat e on It ali an agri cult ure duri ng t he 19t h and earl y 20t h
centuri es,  and  second  di scussing  t he  dat a used  i n  our  analysi s.
2. 1  Tenancy  and  Ag r i cult ure i n  Ear l y  20th  Ce nt ury  Ital y
The  convent i onal   vi ew  hol ds t hat   I t ali an f armi ng wa s   dom i nat ed by i neff i cient  and
backw ard t enure system s, such as sharecroppi ng,  wh i ch distort ed incenti ves and l ed to
subopt i ma l   all ocati ve decisions.   I n r ecent  years,  how ever,   econom i sts have argued t hat   t hi s
vi ew  i s em pir i call y  unproven,   and  evidence  t o  t he  cont r ary  has  been presented.
The  t wo   ma i n  f eatures of  t he  I t ali an econom y  i n  t he  years before Wo r l d  Wa r   I   are i t s
f undam ent all y agrari an character  ( i n 1911 f armi ng account ed f or  55. 5 percent  of  t he l abour
f orce,  and  46  per  cent  of  GDP  ( Fenoal t ea 1983,   Toni ol o  1990)) ,   and  i t s dual i sti c nat ure,  wi t h
a r elati vel y r i ch i ndust r i al  No r t h and a poor  agrari an Sout h.   Be f ore 1914,   No r t hern r egions
had per capi t a i ncom es and product i vi t y bet w een 2. 5 and 5 t i me s   greater  t han t he Sout h' s
( Feder i co 1996,  Ga l assi and Cohen 1992,  Zam agni  1978),  a gap t hat  has not  show n a
t endency  t o  shri nk  ( Zam agni   1993).3
Du a l i sm  and t he persistence of a large agrari an sector are the m ai n t hem es of
m odern  I t ali an econom i c hi story.   Gr am sci  ( 1950)  and  Ser eni  ( 1946,   1947)  argued  t hat   at  t he
t i me   of  pol i t i cal  uni f i cati on ( 1861),   ' m odern'   agrari an i nst i t ut i ons onl y existed i n No r t hern
I t aly,  wh e r e the precondi t i ons w ere set for agri cult ural grow t h and event ual l y i ndust r i al
devel opm ent .  On  t he cont r ary,  in centr al and Sout hern It aly,  'f eudal residues'  di scouraged
product i vi t y-enhanci ng i nvest me n t s and kept  t he peasantr y i n a st ate of povert y and
subj ecti on t o rural lords.  As  t he i ssue of tenancy system s is centr al to our paper,  it  is
wo r t hw hi l e di scussing  t hese  arr angem ent s i n  som e det ail .
The convent i onal  wi sdom  hol ds t hat  pre-1914 rural It aly can be di vi ded i n t hree
areas.  I n  t he  No r t h,   f armi ng  wa s   a ma r ket   ori ented busi ness r un  by  l andow ners wi t h  salari ed
wo r kers,  or  by  r i ch t enants payi ng  f i xed  r ents.  Shar e t enants we r e com m on  i n  som e areas i n
t he No r t h but   we r e usual l y we l l   off   peasants w ho coul d suppl y t hei r   ow n draft   anima l s and
t ool s (Poni  1982).  In centr al It aly,  wh e r e share contr acts w ere by far the m ost  c o mmo n
t enure system ,  croppers we r e usual l y poor  and unabl e t o suppl y capit al  equi pm ent .   Far ms
we r e sm all   and  i nt ensivel y  cult i vat ed,  but   l i t t l e m achinery  wa s   used.   Fur t her  Sout h,   r oughl y
f r om   Rome   dow n,   l arge  l ati f undi a we r e l eased by  an i ndol ent  and  absenteeist  ari stocracy t o
mi ddl em en w ho then subl et to sm al l  peasants or hi r ed landl ess labourers at peak ti me s .
Ag r i cult ure in t he Cent r e and Sout h w as t hus st arved of capit al,  as evidenced by i t s low
product i vi t y  and  pri mi t i ve  t echni ques.   H ence,  t he  convent i onal   story  goes,   t he  backw ardness
of  I t aly' s econom y,   and  i n  part i cular  t he  povert y  of  t he  Sout h.
M odern research has cast a great deal of doubt  on t hi s view . R ecent wo r k
( Be vi l acqua 1990,  Lupo 1990,  Ga l assi and Zam agni  1994) has show n t hat  bot h l andl ords
and  peasants i n  t he  Sout h  we r e wi l l i ng  t o  i nnovat e and  t ake r i sks under  t he  r i ght   condi t i ons,
i nt r oduci ng  new  crops and adj ust i ng t hei r  crop m i x w hen t he m arket  provi ded adequat e
i ncenti ves.   Fur t her,   t he  vi ew  of  t enuri al  arr angem ent s as ‘ f eudal   r esidues’  has  been seri ousl y
undermi ned.   The  i nst i t ut i ons of  r ural  I t aly have been r eassessed by Cohen and Ga l assi  i n a
seri es of  papers approaching  t enure choi ce as an agency probl em  under  obj ecti ve  const r aint s
( 1990,   1992,   1994;   Lupori ni   and Par i gi   1996 f or  f orma l   m odel l i ng).   Thei r   exam inat i on of
f actor proport i ons and product i vi t y for sharecroppi ng areas in centr al It aly suggest s that
product i vi t y di f f erences had m ore to do w i t h t he envi r onm ent  i n w hi ch farme r s w ere
operati ng t han i nst i t ut i onal  probl em s. Cos t  benefi t  analysi s of capit al i nvest me n t s on4
sharecropped f arms   has r evealed t hat   del ayed m echanizati on i n centr al  I t aly wa s   due not   t o
t enure arr angem ent s but   t o r elati ve f actor  pri ces ( Ga l assi  1993).   Mo r eover,   t he Sout h,   l ong
pi ctured as a l and dom i nat ed by l arge estates wo r ked by wa g e   l abour,   t urns out   t o cont ain
cont r actual   arr angem ent s of  mu c h   greater  vari ety and i nt r i cacy.  We   w oul d argue t hat   t hese
t enancy relati onshi ps represented rati onal  r esponses by l andl ords and t enants to t he
probl em s of  hi gh  i ncom e  vari ance,  i ncom pl ete or  non-existent  credit   and  i nsurance ma r ket s,
adverse i ncenti ves,   and  del i cate cash crops.
I n  t he  No r t h,   wh e r e t he  cli ma t e all ow ed  f arme r s a wi der  r ange  of  crop  and  l i vest ock
choi ce,  di versif i cati on  wa s   eff ecti ve  as a r i sk-m anagem ent   t echni que.   Sm al l   scale credit   wa s
also easier  t o  com e by,   and  evidence  suggest s t hat   at  all   events crop  yi elds  i n  No r t hern  I t aly
we r e less vari able than i n t he hot  and dry Cent r e and Sout h (Ga l assi and Cohen 1994).
Re l ati vel y l ow  r i sk and w eak agency probl em s not   surpri singl y we r e associated wi t h f i xed
r ent  or  wa g e   cont r acts.  Si mi l ar  mo t i vat i ons  expl ain  w hy  f i xed  r ent  and  wa g e   cont r acts i n  t he
Sout h w ere li nked w i t h grain grow i ng,  except that  greater exogenous ri sks there forced
f arme r s to di versif y by ent eri ng i nt o m ul t i pl e contr acts. Shar e tenancy in t he Cent r e and
Sout h w as associated w it h t r ee crops,  wh i l e in t he N ort h share tenants w ere m ore oft en
f arme r s w ho had access to som e non-t r adeable input .  The di f f erence betw een the
sharecropped  f arms   i n  t he  Ce nt r e and  t he  crop-specif i c share cont r acts com m on  i n  t he  Sout h
can also be expl ained as di versif i cati on,  as in t he ri skier envi r onm ent  of t he Sout h
sharecroppers preferr ed to farm  scatt ered plot s rather than t ake on a singl e farm a s  i n t he
Ce nt r e.
The  case f or  t he r eassessm ent  of  t he t r adit i onal   story r ests l argel y on t he assert i on
t hat  im port ant it em s in t he M edi t err anean crop m i x w ere subj ect to part i cularl y st r ong
exogenous i nfl uences.  The m easures of ri sk previousl y used t o support  thi s (Ga l assi and
Cohen 1994,   590),   suggest i ve t hough t hey ma y   be,   are undeni ably crude.   I n t hi s paper,   we
use an adaptati on of  t he approach used i n f i nanci al  analysi s f or  t he assessm ent  of  r i sk,  t o
gi ve a bet t er pi cture of the ri sk characteri sti cs of the agri cult ural estates typi cal of 19
t h
century  Tuscany.5
2. 2  The   Da t a.
The  advant age of  share cont r acts f r om  t he perspecti ve of  t he hi stori cal  econom i st  i s
t hat  they requi r e bot h part i es to keep accurate account s. Especiall y w here landow nership
wa s   concentr ated,  as i n Tuscany,   and l andl ords used hi r ed m anagers,  t he account   books of
num erous  f arms   have  survi ved,   so t hat   precise r ecords  exist  f or  l ong  peri ods  of  t i me .   By  t he
19t h century,  indi vi dual  sharecropped farms  ( poderi )  bel ongi ng t o l arge l andl ords w ere
usual l y grouped t oget her  i n a centr al  organi sati on call ed a f at t ori a.   The  f at t ori a i n eff ect
f unct i oned  as an adm ini str ati ve  body,   m oni t ori ng  i ndi vi dual   t enants and  keeping  account s
f or each indi vi dual  podere,  and as an imp l em ents pool ,  purchasing expensi ve or
i ndi vi sibl e capit al input s such as threshing m achi nes.  It  is fr om  t he account  ledgers of
t hree Tuscan fat t ori e fr om  1870 t o t he G reat Wa r  that  all  dat a used in t hi s w ork w ere
obt ained.   I n  order  of  size,  t hey  are:  Cerbai a,   372  ha,   near  Sovi cil l e,  15  km   we s t   of  Si ena;
M acereto,   315. 8 ha,   near  Ca s c i ano di   Mu r l o,   i n t he clay soil s 25 km  sout h of  Si ena;  and
Poggi o  l e Ros e,   25. 5  ha,   i n  Cos t afabbri ,   5  km   sout h  we s t   of  Si ena.
Si t uat ed i n  t he  heart   of  Tuscany,   t hese  f arms   we r e selected because t hey  r epresent
t hree t ypes  of  t err ain  com m on  t hroughout   centr al  I t aly.   Cerbai a  i s l ocated i n  w ooded  hi l l s
som e 60 km  i nl and,  i n an area of i nt ensive cul t i vat i on over di f f i cult  ground,  wh e r e
t em peratures drop dram ati call y i n wi nt er.   M acereto i s i n undul ati ng count r y wi t h dense
clay soil s wh e r e a r elati vel y  extensive  f orm  of  f armi ng  wa s   practi sed.  Poggi o  l e Ros e  i s a
sm all  farm j ust  out side t he ci t y l i mi t s, i n an area of dense set t l em ent and i nt ensive
agri cult ure.  The  t hree f arms   we r e adm ini stered by  t he  sam e m anager  over  t hi s peri od,   and
t hei r  ledgers are kept  in t he St ate A rchive i n Si ena (l edgers for 1900 and 1909 are
mi ssing).  Ou r  chronol ogy refl ects the need t o have a suff i cientl y l ong t i me  p e r i od
undi sturbed by wa r s and pol i t i cal  upheavals before t he i nt r oduct i on of  ma c h i nery i n t he
post - 1945  years.
The f at t ori a l edgers w ere organi sed in t hree part s. The f i r st r ecorded t he
l andl ord' s share of out put  produced over the account i ng peri od,  the seed distr i but ed,
r evenues f r om   sales,  and  expendi t ures.  The  di vi sion  of  out put   occurr ed aft er  t he  seed f or
t he next  season had been set  aside,  so the quant i t i es report ed here consist of twi ce the
out put   r ecorded  i n  t he  account s pl us  seed.  The  second  part   of  t he  account   books  r eport ed6
statem ents of  out standi ng  debt   or  credit   bet w een t enants and  l andl ords,   and  t he  t hi r d  dealt
wi t h l i vest ock on each podere.   The  r eli abil i t y of  l edger  entr i es i s usual l y r eckoned t o be
very  good.
Al lpoderi  on t hese farms  we r e conti nuousl y l eased w it h share contr acts in t he peri od
under consi derati on,  wi t h t he excepti on of Terre a M ano i n t he M acereto farm,  wh e r e
wa g e  wo r kers w ere used. Wh i l e over ti m e som e poderi  we r e sold or bought ,  w e have
f ocused our analysi s on t hose 16 poderi  for wh i ch w e have an uni nt err upt ed run of
observat i ons ( 8 i n t he Cerbai a f arm,   5 -   i ncl udi ng t he pl ot   f arme d   wi t h wa g e   wo r kers -
f or M acereto,   and 3 f or  Poggi o Le  Ros e) .   Each of  t hese produced a vari ety of  crops,   on
average bet w een 8 and 10.   For   all   annual   crops ( except  ma i ze)  we   have i nforma t i on on
seed distr i but ed annual l y t o t he sharecroppers. W e do not ,  how ever,  have a w ay of
m easuri ng how  m uch l and w as used for tr ees (grapevines,  ol i ve t r ees, mu l berr i es for
sil kw orms ,   f r ui t   t r ees)  wh i ch f orme d   an i m port ant  part   of  t hese  f arms ’   t ot al  out put ,   nor  do
w e know  w hat  proport i on of the farm  consi sted of w ooded areas (mo s t  relevant for
Cerbai a).  Som e pr oduct s that  we r e probabl y i m port ant in t he sharecroppers’ econom y
( poul t r y,  eggs,  product s of veget able gardens,  charcoal)  we r e not  recorded by t he farm
adm ini str ati on,   since t he  l andl ord  di d  not   r eceive  a share.  The  vari abil i t y  of  t he  croppers’
i ncom es ma y   t hus appear  som ew hat  di stort ed i n our  calculati on,   but   t here i s no wa y   of
j udgi ng w het her t hi s is by excess or defect.  Shar ecroppers, i n any event ,  t ended t o
consum e  mo s t   of  t hei r   share of  t he  out put   r ather  t han  sell i ng  i t   on  t he  ma r ket .
3  An  em pirical  anal ysi s of  output   risk
The  out put   f r om  agri cult ural  acti vi t y r epresents an uncert ain r eturn on a subst anti al
capit al  i nvest me n t   i n l and,   seed,  etc.  As   wi t h any ot her  r i sky i nvest me n t   prospect ,   r i sk can
be cont r ol l ed to som e ext ent by m eans of di versif i cati on.  The gr eater extent of
di versif i cati on avail able t o l andl ords ow ni ng l arge estates,  t han t o t enants dependi ng on t he
wo r ki ng  of  a sm all   podere,   i s an i ssue r elevant  t o  m any  aspects of  agri cult ure.  I n  part i cular,
r i sk-shari ng has l ong been recogni sed as a possibl e m oti vat i on for the w i despread use of
sharecroppi ng cont r acts. In t he absence of ri sk, sharecroppi ng i s som eti m es seen as an
i neff i cient  system  wh i ch w eakens t enants’  econom i c i ncenti ves  by  i m posi ng  an arr angem ent
equi val ent to an out put  tax. In an earl i er art i cle, deali ng w i t h Tuscan agri cult ure in t he7
f i f t eenth century,  we  f ound t hat  sharecroppi ng w as part i cularl y i mp o r t ant f or pl ot s
produci ng w i ne and ol i ve oi l ,  bot h of wh i ch are crops produced fr om  l ong-l i ved capi t al
goods (vi nes and ol i ve t r ees).  A  possibl e alt ernat i ve expl anati on for t he persistence of
sharecroppi ng  wa s   gi ven,   based  on  t wo   i nst i t ut i onal   and  t echni cal  f eatures:  t hat   enforceable
l ong-t erm  t enure cont r acts coul d not   be ma d e   ( since t enants alwa y s   had t he r i ght   t o l eave);
and  t hat   vi nes  and  t r ees we r e vul nerable t o  dam age  f r om   cult i vat i on  pat t erns  produci ng  hi gh
short - t erm  out put ,   at  t he expense of  t he l ong-t erm  val ue of  t he underl yi ng capit al  goods.   I n
t hi s cont ext,  the out put  tax imp l i cit  in sharecroppi ng coul d have t he benefi cial eff ect of
det err i ng  opport uni sti c short - t erm  behavi our.
I t  is dif f i cult  to di sti ngui sh betw een the ri sk-shari ng and opport uni sm  m odel s
wi t hout   havi ng a clear  pi cture of  t he r elati onshi p bet w een r i sk and out put   mi x,   and also
t he relati ve degrees of ri sk borne by t enants and landlords under alt ernat i ve t enure
cont r acts.  Thi s l att er  i ssue depends  on  t he  l andl ord’s scope  f or  r educt i on  of  r i sk by  m eans
of out put  di versif i cati on.  In t he i nst i t ut i onal  str uct ure of sharecroppi ng i n t hi s region,
crop choi ce wa s   i n t he hands of  t he l andl ord,   w ho ( or  w hose agents)  stored t he seed and
di str i but ed i t   t o  t he  t enants.  The  l andl ord  ma y   t hen  be  expected t o  have  pursued an estate-
wi de  di versif i cati on  str ategy,   spreading  t he  crop  port f ol i o  across poderi .   Two  const r aint s
l i mi t ed his fr eedom  of choi ce in any gi ven year,  how ever,  one t echni cal and one
i nst i t ut i onal .  Fi r st,  the fact that  a large proport i on of the est ate’s (and each podere’s)
out put   wa s   produced by t r ee crops wi t h l ong l ead t i me s   and hi gh sunk costs m eant  t hat
r apid adjust me n t s of  t he port f ol i o we r e not   f easibl e.  Secondl y,   because t enants r eli ed on
t he produce of  t he pl ot   f or  t hei r   subsi stence,  t he l andl ord coul d not   avail   hi ms e l f   of  hi s
f ul l   di screti onary  pow er  over  crop  choi ce wi t hout   i ncurr i ng  r esentme n t   and  opposi t i on.   I n
part   t hi s coul d be mi t i gat ed by acti ng t o sm oot h consum pt i on over  t i me   f or  t enants wh o
f ell  int o arr ears, but  thi s w as hardl y an att r acti ve opt i on i f  tenants w ere then unabl e to
sett l e.  The  expectati on  t hen  i s t hat   t he  crop  mi x  w oul d  change slow l y  over  t i me .
3. 1  A  f ram ew ork f or  t he  anal ysi s of  output   risk
De f i ne t he fol l ow i ng not ati on.  Yt pf
c()  i s a m easure of the out put  of the ct h crop
produced by t he pt h podere i n f at t ori af ,  duri ng year t ,  wh e r e c =  1… C . X t pf
c () i s a8
corr espondi ng vect or of system ati c, predictable infl uences on t he out put ,  incl udi ng l and,
l abour,   seed and ot her  i nput s all ocated t o t he crop,   and external   condi t i ons condi t i ons such
as the t enant’ s abil i t y,  and t he predictable com ponent  of local cli ma t e. The t echnol ogy i s
assum ed t o  be  as f ol l ow s:
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wh e r ey t pf
c () i s the nat ural l og of out put
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c () () () =− m  is the random  or ri sky
com ponent   of  out put .   No t e t hat ,   i f   () m Xt pf
c ()  can t hought   of  as t he  sum  of  t wo   com ponent s:
t he  ( l og)  of  an i ni t i al  i nvest me n t   of  r esources, m
c;   and  a r em aini ng  com ponent  r efl ecti ng  t he
system ati c part ,  r
c,  of the return on t hat  invest me n t .  De f i ni ng M
c as e
c m ,  w e can then


























1                                        ( 2)
I n t hi s sense, rt pf
c () can be vi ew ed as the unpredictable part  of an approxi ma t e rate of
r eturn  on  assets em ployed.
Ou r  obj ecti ve i s to analyse t he ext ent of out put  ri sk at the l evel of the i ndi vi dual
podere,   t he f at t ori a and t he estate as a w hol e,  and t o assess t he wa y   t hat   t he all ocati on of
r i sk bet w een l andl ord  and  t enants i s i nfl uenced  by  crop  mi x  and  di versif i cati on.   As   our  basi c
i ndi cator of ri sk, we  u s e  t he convent i onal  not i on of vol ati l i t y,  defi ned as t he st andard
devi ati on  of  t he  unpredictable com ponent   of  t he  r eturn  on  assets i nvest ed.  At   t he  l evel  of  t he




c r = var                                                                                                   ( 3)
1  Ou t put   i s m easured here i n  val ue  t erms ,   wi t h  out put s val ued  at  t he  average ( over  t he  w hol e peri od)  of  t he
account i ng pri ces used in t he f at t ori a records.  Tr ue m arket  pri ces are not  avail able, so our analysi s
necessari l y  abstr acts f r om   pri ce r i sk.  Of   course,  even i f   actual   crop pri ces we r e avail able,  so t hat   we   could
conduct   t he analysi s i n t erms   of  t he r i sk associated wi t h nom i nal   f arm  i ncom e,   t here w oul d sti l l   r em ain an
elem ent of ri sk associated w it h unpredictable local vari ati ons i n real incom e st e mmi ng fr om  t he general
consum er  pri ce l evel  wh i ch mi ght   be  corr elated wi t h  vari ati ons  i n  f arm  yei l ds.9
The t ot al out put  of an agri cult ural uni t  i s analogous t o an i nvest me n t  port f ol i o,  wi t h
pot enti all y di f f erent  r eturns on each of  t he const i t uent   crops.   Si nce all   crops are aff ected t o
som e extent by a com m on set  of w eather and husbandry condi t i ons w i t hi n any one year,
t here i s l i kel y  t o  be  som e covari ati on  of  t he  r eturns  on  di f f erent  crops.   I f   t he  covari ances are
l arge and posi t i ve,  t hen t here w il l  be l i t t l e scope for ri sk reduct i on by di versif i cati on,
wh e r eas i f   t he covari ances are sm all   ( and part i cularl y i f   t hey are negat i ve),   l andl ords wi t h
l arge  di versif i ed crop  port f ol i os  wi l l   benefi t   f r om   subst anti all y  r educed out put   r i sk.  The  t ot al
out put   r i sk f or  any  part i cular  podere  depends  on  t wo   f actors:  t he  crop  mi x  and  t he  ma t r i x  of
cont em poraneous covari ances betw een the returns on di f f erent crops.  The crop m i x i s





= ∑ 1   The  covari ance ma t r i x  of  r eturns  i s  { } Ω pf pf
cd cd C == s ,, . . . 1,   wh e r e s pf
cd
i s t he  covari ance bet w een r t pf
c ()  and r t pf
d ().   The  i ndex  of  t ot al  out put   r i sk i s t hen:
s pf pf pf pf pf pf mr m m == var(' ) ' Ω                                                                           ( 4)
wh e r er pf  i s t he  C×1  vector  of  r andom   crop  r eturns.
An a l ogous r i sk m easures can also be defi ned at  t he f at t ori a and estate l evels.  For   a
part i cular fat t ori a f ,   cont aini ng nf   i ndi vi dual   poderi ,   t he vector  of  port f ol i o shares, m f . ,   i s
Cn f ×1  and  i s defi ned  as:
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                                                                ( 6)
wh e r e Ρpq
f   i s t he C×C ma t r i x of covari ances betw een the crop returns on t he pt h and qt h
poderi   wi t hi n  f at t ori a  f .   The  r i sk f or  f at t ori a  f   i s t hen:10
s ff f f mm = .. . ' Ω                                                                                                 ( 7)
An   analogous expression i s used t o const r uct   t he r i sk m easure f or  t he w hol e estate.  I n t hat
case,  wi t h  16  poderi   used  i n  t he  calculati ons,   and  pot enti all y  15  di f f erent  crops,   t he  order  of
t he  l oadi ng  vector  and  covari ance ma t r i x  i s 240.
3. 2  Es t i ma t es
I n i mp l em enti ng t hi s approach to ri sk m easurem ent,  we  a r e faced w it h t he
probl em  t hat   bot h t he covari ance ma t r i ces Ω  and t he l oadi ng vectors m a r e unknow n and
mu s t  be est i ma t ed. The r i sk indi ces could be est i ma t ed str aight f orwa r dl y i f  dat a w ere
avail able f or  t he  vectors rpf.   Ho we v e r ,   t hese  are not   observabl e,  and  mu s t   be  const r uct ed as
t he r esidual s f r om  som e f orm  of  r egression r elati onshi p used t o approxi ma t e t he system ati c
part   of  t he r elati onshi p ( 1).   Thi s i s not   a simp l e ma t t er;   t he r egression f unct i on  () m Xt pf
c ()
r epresents t he  vari ati ons  over  t i me   i n  t he  l and  all ocated t o  each crop,   t he  am ount   of  seed and
f ert i l i ser  used,   l abour  and  capit al  i nput s and  t he  state of  know l edge  and  t echnol ogy.   Mo s t   of
t hi s com plex of  f actors i s not   r ecorded  i n  t he  f arm  l edgers,  and  onl y  a simp l e approxi ma t i on
t o () m Xt pf
c ()  i s t herefore possibl e.  For t unat ely,   our  sam ple peri od wa s   one of  stabil i t y and
r elati vel y sl ow  change i n t he character of It ali an agri cult ure. Ap a r t  fr om  a few  cases of
peri ods wh e n   part i cular  crops we r e di scont i nued on part i cular  podere,   t here i s no obvi ous
evidence i n t he out put   or  seed seri es of  ma j or  shif t s i n t he all ocati on of  l and t o i ndi vi dual
crops,   wi t hi n  poderi .   Wi t h  16  poderi   and  up  t o  15  crops  one  each,  i t   i s not   f easibl e t o  show
all   t he  out put   seri es graphi call y.   Ho we v e r ,   f i gures 1-3  show   t he  out put s of  t he  ma i n  crops  on
t hree representati ve poderi :  Casanova i n t he Cerbai a fat t ori a;  Pal azzo (M acereto) and



















































WH E A T
WI NE
OTHER  CROPS
Fi gure1 O ut put   shares f or  t he  Casanova  ( Ce r bai a)  podere




























Four sets of esti ma t es w ere produced,  usi ng al t ernat i ve approaches to t he
esti ma t i on of  t he f unct i on µ( t )  and i ndi cators of yi eld.  The f our approaches are as
f ol l ow s:
i .L i near  r egression  of  l og  out put   on  a const ant  and  t i me .
i i .L i near  r egression  on  a const ant  and  t i me   of  a dependent   vari able defi ned  as t he
l og of eit her out put  di vi ded by seed (f or the fi ve crops w heat ,  oat s, vet ches,
beans and  broadbeans)  or  out put   ( f or  all   ot her  crops).
i i i . A  non-param eteri c regression of l og out put  on t i me ,  usi ng t he N adaraya-
Wa t son kernel  esti ma t or,  wi t h a G aussi an kernel  and bandw i dt h h=5 (see
Hä r dl e, 1990;  Pudney,  1993).  He u r i sti call y,  t hi s am ount s to est i ma t i ng t he
hei ght  of the regression funct i on at  any dat e, usi ng a sm oot h l ocal averaging
procedure i n  wh i ch 90%   of  t he  we i ght   i s gi ven  t o  observat i ons  wi t hi n  16  years
or  so of    t he  year  i n  quest i on.
Fi gure3 O ut put   shares f or  t he  Poggi o  l e Ros e   podere13
i v. A  non-param eteri c regression on t i me  o f  a dependent  vari able defi ned as t he
l og of eit her out put  di vi ded by seed (f or the fi ve crops w heat ,  oat s, vet ches,
beans and broadbeans) or out put  (f or all  ot her crops).  The Nadar aya-Wa t son
kernel   esti ma t or  wa s   used,   wi t h  a G aussian kernel   and  bandw i dt h  h=5.
These alt ernat i ve approaches produce di f f eri ng est i ma t es, but  a com m on
pat t ern em erges.   For   t he sake of  brevit y,   we   r eproduce here onl y one set  of  r esult s:
t hose f or  t he non-param etr i c t r end r egression appl i ed t o l og out put   ( approach ( i i i ) ) ,
but   t hese  are broadl y  r epresentati ve  of  t he  ot her  me t hods  also.  To  gi ve  an i dea of  t he
abil i t y of nonparam etr i c regression t o capture nonl i near tr ends i n t he out put  dat a,
f i gures 4  and  5  show   t he  esti ma t ed t r end  and  r aw  dat a f or  t wo   cases:  w heat  and  wi ne












































Tabl es 1, 2 and 3 gi ve t he est i ma t ed ri sk m easures  $ s pf
c  of the pseudo-r eturns on
each crop,  separately for each podere.  The crops i ncl uded i n t hese t ables are onl y
t hose f or  wh i ch an out put   i s r ecorded i n at  l east  hal f   of  t he 45 years covered by t he
sam ple  peri od.
Tabl e 1S t andard devi ati ons of esti ma t ed returns on crops for the pl ot s of
t he  Ce r bai a f at t ori a  ( non-param etr i c t r end  esti ma t es)
As c i ano Casanova Cast ell i na Col om bai o Ce r bai ol aC h i usi no Poggi arell o Chi usa
W heat 0.206 0. 201 0. 222 0. 237 0. 350 0. 497 0. 257 0. 244
Br oadbeans 0. 500 0. 549 0. 536 0. 529 0. 706 - 0. 464 0. 578
Ve t ches 0.625 0. 616 0. 500 0. 571 0. 724 - 0. 473 0. 602
Oa t s0 . 660 0. 522 0. 340 0. 507 0. 679 - 0. 458 0. 526
B eans 0.760 0. 578 0. 580 0. 557 0. 742 - 0. 467 0. 640
Ma i ze 0.594 0. 403 0. 463 0. 527 0. 561 - 0. 336 0. 415
Wi ne 0. 552 0. 492 0. 565 0. 369 0. 463 - 0. 439 0. 412
Oi l- 0 . 876 0. 694 0. 668 0. 845 - 0. 888 0. 952
W ool 0. 336 0. 234 0. 260 0. 294 0. 523 - 0. 167 0. 178
C heese - - - 0.447 - - 0. 280 -
Si l k0 . 373 0. 634 0. 505 0. 466 - - 0. 499 -
Che s t nut s0 . 896 0. 929 0. 990 0. 918 0. 906 - 1. 002 1. 004
Fi gure 5  Ac t ual   and  f i t t ed l og  out put   of  wi ne  f or  Casanova  ( Ce r bai a)15
Tabl e 2S t andard devi ati ons of esti ma t ed returns on crops for the pl ot s of
t he  M acereto  f at t ori a  ( non-param etr i c t r end  esti ma t es)
M aceretoP a l azzo PalazaccioT e r r e a Ma n o B a r ot t ol i
W heat 0.795 0. 671 0. 693 0. 499 0. 202
Br oadbeans 1. 201 1. 037 1. 300 1. 413 0. 661
Ve t ches 0.845 1. 094 1. 183 - 0. 647
Oa t s- 1 . 225 - - 0. 723
B eans 0.965 1. 271 0. 911 - 0. 748
Ma i ze 0.827 0. 833 0. 826 - 0. 383
Wi ne 1. 040 0. 841 1. 023 0. 821 0. 528
Oi l0 . 908 - - - -
W ool 0. 872 1. 277 1. 147 - 0. 436
He mp - 0 . 814 0. 979 - 0. 547
C heese - - - - 0.465
Si l k0 . 682 1. 015 1. 653 1. 789 0. 367
Che s t nut s0 . 845 - - - -
Tabl e 3S t andard devi ati ons of esti ma t ed returns on crops for t he pl ot s of t he
Poggi o  l e Ros e   f at t ori a  ( non-param etr i c t r end  esti ma t es)
Casanova Pozzo Poggi o  l e r ose
W heat 0.187 0. 205 0. 298
Br oadbeans 0. 519 0. 594 0. 670
Ma i ze 0.569 0. 467 0. 545
Wi ne 0. 545 0. 508 0. 685
Oi l1 . 396 1. 261 1. 069
He mp - 0 . 408 -
Si l k0 . 589 0. 954 0. 277
The f i r st obvi ous concl usi on t hat  em erges fr om  t hese est i ma t es is that  ri sk
vari ed enorm ousl y across crop t ypes.  I n part i cular t r ee crops (wi ne,  oi l  and
chestnut s) we r e clearl y associated w it h hi gh l evels of out put  ri sk. If  we  r e-do t he
analysi s f or  t wo   com posi t e crops:   t r ee crops and all   ot her  crops and t hen calculate
out put - we i ght ed averages of  t he $ s pf
c   across all   poderi ,   t he r esult   i s an average r i sk
i ndex  f or  t r ee crops  r oughl y  doubl e t he  size of  t hat   f or  non-t r ee crops  ( t able 4).16
Tabl e 4S t andard  devi ati ons  of  esti ma t ed r eturns  on  t r ee crops  and  non-t r ee
crops  ( non-param etr i c t r end  esti ma t es)
Tr ee crops N on-t r ee crops A l l   crops
Es t ate l evel
1 0. 328 0. 149 0. 150
Fat t ori a  l evel
2 0. 437 0. 196 0. 202
Podere  l evel
3 0. 571 0. 295 0. 276
1  out put - we i ght ed averages of  r i sk i ndi ces f or  out put s aggregated t o  estate l evel
2  out put - we i ght ed averages of  r i sk i ndi ces f or  out put s at  t he  f at t ori a  l evel
3  out put - we i ght ed averages of  r i sk i ndi ces f or  out put s at  t he  podere  l evel
Ri sk also vari ed consi derably  across poderi ,   even f or  t he  sam e crop  –  f or  i nst ance
t he ri sk m easure for w heat increases by a factor of four as w e go fr om  t he l east to t he
mo s t   r i sky podere.   U navoi dabl e esti ma t i on and specif i cati on err ors ma y   pl ay som e part
i n t hi s, but  t he robust ness of t hi s fi ndi ng across the four approaches w e have used
suggest s that  it  is m ost li kel y t o be t he out com e of di f f erences in m i cro-cli ma t e, soil
condi t i ons  and  f armi ng  t echni que.
A  second fi ndi ng i s that  ri skiness vari ed subst anti all y across poderi ,  but  wa s
everyw here extr em ely hi gh f or  t enants and consi derably l ow er  at  t he f at t ori a and estate
l evel.   The  l andl ord  t hus  appears t o  have  pursued a successful   di versif i cati on  str ategy  i n  a
r i sky region,  and yet  the very fact that  he w as abl e to do so raises im port ant quest i ons
about   t he  r ol e of  r i sk i n  t enure choi ce i n  t hi s case.  Hi gh  out put   vari abil i t y,   once t he  t r end
i s f actored out ,   i s det ected i n t he sam ple bot h over  t i me   wi t hi n a gi ven pl ot ,   and i n t he
sam e year across dif f erent poderi .  Cr oppers’ perf orm ance, i n ot her wo r ds,  w as not
observabl e ex post   f r om   t he  harvest :   t he  l evel  of  noi se wa s   simp l y  t oo  hi gh.   The  concept
of  a ‘ norma l ’   year  i s elusi ve  i n  t hi s cont ext,   as i s t he  i dea of  usi ng  ot her  croppers’  harvest
as a benchm ark t o j udge t he eff ort   put   i n by any gi ven i ndi vi dual .   Thi s i s ma d e   clear  by
i nspect i on  of  t he  corr elati ons  bet w een r eturns  on  di f f erent  crops  wi t hi n  t he  sam e podere,
and f or  t he sam e crops across di f f erent  poderi .   Ther e are t oo m any of  t hese corr elati ons
f or  us  t o  r eproduce  t hem   i n  f ul l ,   but   t ables 5-7  are t ypi cal.   They  show   t he  ma i n  bet w een-
crop corr elati ons for one representati ve podere (Casanova) and t he bet w een-pl ot
corr elati ons for two  i m port ant crops:  w heat and w i ne.  The r em arkabl e feature of these
t ables is how  l ow  t he corr elati ons are. On  t he basi s of these,  it  w oul d be very di f f i cult17
i ndeed to j udge t he perf orm ance of one t enant by com pari ng hi s out put  wi t h t hat  of
anot her.
Tabl e 5C o r r elati ons  bet w een crop  r eturns  f or  t he  Casanova  podere
W heat B roadbeans V et ches O ats B eans M aize W ine O i l
W heat 1.00 -0. 03 0. 07 -0. 00 0. 28 0. 14 0. 29 -0. 13
Br oadbeans -0. 03 1. 00 0. 16 0. 02 0. 08 0. 15 0. 04 0. 17
Ve t ches 0.07 0. 16 1. 00 -0. 16 0. 25 0. 03 0. 08 0. 21
Oa t s- 0. 00 0. 02 -0. 16 1. 00 0. 07 0. 05 -0. 15 -0. 00
B eans 0.28 0. 08 0. 25 0. 07 1. 00 0. 19 0. 26 0. 11
Ma i ze 0.14 0. 15 0. 03 0. 05 0. 19 1. 00 -0. 17 0. 15
Wi ne 0. 29 0. 04 0. 08 -0. 15 0. 26 -0. 17 1. 00 0. 03
Oi l- 0. 13 0. 17 0. 21 -0. 00 0. 11 0. 15 0. 03 1. 00
Tabl e 6C o r r elati ons  bet w een r eturns  on  w heat  f or  vari ous  poderi
As c i ano Casanova M aceretoB a r ot t ol i Pozzo Poggi o
As c i ano 1.00 0. 78 0. 02 0. 55 0. 25 0. 33
Casanova 0. 78 1. 00 0. 06 0. 34 0. 36 0. 32
M acereto0 . 02 0. 06 1. 00 0. 20 0. 09 -0. 05
Ba r ot t ol i0 . 55 0. 34 0. 20 1. 00 0. 22 0. 21
Pozzo 0.25 0. 36 0. 09 0. 22 1. 00 0. 38
Poggi o0 . 33 0. 32 -0. 05 0. 21 0. 38 1. 00
Tabl e 7C o r r elati ons  bet w een r eturns  on  wi ne  f or  vari ous  poderi
As c i ano Casanova M aceretoB a r ot t ol i Pozzo Poggi o
As c i ano 1.00 0. 88 0. 44 0. 73 0. 70 0. 54
Casanova 0. 88 1. 00 0. 41 0. 66 0. 54 0. 59
M acereto0 . 44 0. 41 1. 00 0. 39 0. 24 0. 26
Ba r ot t ol i0 . 73 0. 66 0. 39 1. 00 0. 53 0. 41
Pozzo 0.70 0. 54 0. 24 0. 53 1. 00 0. 62
Poggi o0 . 54 0. 59 0. 26 0. 41 0. 62 1. 00
The scope for di versif i cati on of out put  ri sk is sum m ari sed in fi gure 6, wh i ch
show s r i sk m easures f or  crop port f ol i os at  t he l evel  of  i ndi vi dual   poderi ,f at t ori e and t he
estate as a w hole. To do t hi s, w e have est i ma t ed the port f ol i o share vector,  m,  in each
case as t he vector  of  out put   val ue shares.  El em entary port f ol i o t heory suggest s t hat   hi gh
r i sk shoul d be accom panied by hi gh expected r eturn,   so t he use of  out put   shares,  r ather
t han i ni t i al  i nvest me n t   shares ( wh i ch are not   observed),   gi ves sli ght l y t oo hi gh a we i ght18
t o ri skier elem ents of each port f ol i o.
2 Ne v e r t hel ess, unl ess ri sk prem ia w ere very l arge
i ndeed, the bi as int r oduced by t hi s w il l  be sm al l ,  and w e bel i eve that  fi gure 6 gi ves a
r eli able qual i t ati ve pi cture of  t he wa y   t hat   di versif i cati on wo r ked i n practi ce.  The  scope
f or  di versif i cati on  wa s   clearl y  very  l arge.   Fr om   t he  podere  t o  f at t ori a  l evel,   port f ol i o  r i sk
m easures tend t o fall  signi f i cantl y,  the l argest  decli nes bei ng 50%  or mo r e. Fr om  t he
f at t ori a  t o  estate l evel,   t here are f urt her  f all s i n  r i skiness of  up  t o  40%   or  so.
We   have said t hat   t he l andl ord seem s t o have successful l y di versif i ed at  t he estate
l evel.   He   also acted as a banker,   sm oot hi ng  out   consum pt i on  f or  di f f erent  peopl e at  di f f erent
t i me s .  Wh i l e w e do not  know  t enants’ net  credit  posi t i on for these years, there is str ong
evidence t hat  sharecroppers w ere oft en net lenders to t he est ate in w hi ch they w orked,  at
t i me s  f or consi derable sum s (Pasol i ni  1890;  T assinari  1914;  Fat t ori  1973;  Gi acint i  1974;
Vi ol ante 1983;  N ucci and Pel l egri not t i  1994).  The com plexit y of t he cont r act clearl y
em erges fr om  t hese consi derati ons.  Incenti ve com pati bi l i t y i n a si t uat i on characteri sed by
str ong m oral hazard and m et eri ng uncert aint i es, r i sk shari ng on an est ate level wi t h
cult i vat i on  prone  t o  dram ati c out put   sw ings,   credit   screening  ( t he  l andl ord  had  i nforma t i onal
advant ages in credit  provi sion,  as w ell  as being abl e to resort  to credibl e threats, that  an
external  m oneyl ender l acked) and w i t h i t  t he replacem ent of i ncom pl ete or poorl y
f unct i oni ng m arket s, all  have been recogni sed in t he t heoreti cal li t erature (Si ngh 1989).
Wh a t   i s i m port ant  here i s t hat   t hey  clearl y  em erge  f r om   our  analysi s of  crop  r i sk
2  I t   i s possibl e t o i nvent   me t hods f or  ‘ eli mi nat i ng’  t hi s bi as.  For   exam ple,  i f   one bel i eved t hat   t here we r e
suff i cientl y good m arket s for ri sky assets at the t i me ,  one m i ght  use t he capit al asset pri cing m odel  to
esti ma t eβ  coeff i cients f or  each crop on each podere,   and use t hese t o i nfer  t he t he underl yi ng i nvest me n t
shares,  gi ven  assum pti ons  about   t he  safe r ate of  i nt erest  and  t he  ‘ ma r ket ’   r i sk prem ium .   Ho we v e r ,   t hi s ma y
be st r t eching credul i t y rather too far,  and i s in any case unl i kel y t o change fi gure 6 in any i m port ant
qual i t ati ve  sense.19
Fi gure 6D i versif i cati on  of  r i sk at  pl ot ,   f att ori a and  estate l evels
( non-param etr i c t r end  esti ma t es)









Casanova    0. 306
Pozzo    0. 265
Poggi o  l e Ros e     0. 383
Ba r ot t ol i     0. 194
Ter r e a M ano    0. 203
Pal azzacio    0. 242
Pal azzo   0. 358
M acereto    0. 322
Chi usa    0. 312
Poggi arell a   0. 303
Chi usi no    0. 319
Ce r bai ol a   0. 301
Col om bai o    0. 282
Ca s t ell i na    0. 251
Casanova    0. 246
As c i ano    0. 23820
Co nc l usi ons
Ther e are m any m odel s of farm t enure and consequent  tenant behavi our.  At  least
t hree factors are cri t i cal in t hi s li t erature. On e  i s the i ncenti ve propert i es of alt ernat i ve
cont r act types,  through t he di f f erent imp l i cit  out put  taxes they em body.  A  second i s the
cont r ol   of  l ong-l i ved assets such as vi nes and t r ees,  i n sit uat i ons wh e r e equal l y l ong-l i ved
t enancy cont r acts cannot   be enforced,  and wh e r e t he obj ecti ves short - t erm  product i on and
l ong-t erm  ma i nt enance of  t he  capit al  assets ma y   be  i n  confl i ct.   A  t hi r d  i s out put   r i sk,  and  t he
scope  t hat   l andl ords  have  t o  cont r ol   t hei r   ow n  r i sk by  di versif i cati on  of  t hei r   crop  port f ol i os,
and t o share r i sk wi t h t enants by m eans of  f orma l   crop shari ng or  i nforma l   i nsurance and
banki ng  acti vi t i es.
I n  t hi s paper,   we   have  t r i ed t o  assess t he  scale and  nat ure of  out put   r i sk i n  t he  cont ext
of  19
t h  and  earl y  20
t h  century  Tuscan f armi ng  ( ma i nl y  conduct ed under  crop-shari ng  t enure).
Ou r   f i ndi ngs ma k e   i t   very clear  t hat   r i sk wa s   an extr em ely i m port ant  f actor;   t hat   l andl ords
we r e in a very advant ageous posi t i on relati ve t o t hei r  tenants in t erms  o f  ri sk; that  ri sk
shari ng i s l i kel y t o have been a ma j or  f actor  underl yi ng t he use of  sharecroppi ng t enancy.
Thi s last poi nt  i s part i cularl y so i n t he case of t r ee crops,  for wh i ch ri sk levels w ere
extr em ely  hi gh.
The  l arge r andom  com ponent   of  out put   w oul d also have had anot her  eff ect  t hat   i s
i m port ant for t heori es of t enure choice. The apparentl y random  fl uct uat i ons i n out put
bet w een and wi t hi n poderi   and crop t ypes mu s t   have ma d e   i t   very di f f i cult   f or  l andl ords t o
i dent i f y  ‘ shir ki ng’  t enants wi t hout   t he  mo s t   careful   and  costl y  m oni t ori ng  of  t he  process,   as
we l l   as t he  out put ,   of  product i on  by  i ndi vi dual   t enants.  Thi s creates a presum pt i on  i n  f avour
of  i ncenti ve-com pati bl e t enancy cont r acts t hat   r educe t he  r equi r ed extent  of  m oni t ori ng.
I t  i s alw ays goi ng t o be di f f i cult  t o separate these and ot her i nfl uences on t he
cont r act  choi ce decision.   We   bel i eve t hat   a r easonabl e vi ew  i s em ergi ng:   t hat   sharecroppi ng
w as an arr angem ent  t hat  m ay have sat i sfi ed a num ber of obj ecti ves simu l t aneously.  It
all ow ed  vul nerable t enants t o  share out put   r i sks wi t h  l andl ords,   wh i l st  sett i ng  t enants’  wo r k
i ncenti ves at  a poi nt   wh i ch encouraged mo r e eff ort   t han a wa g e   cont r act  w oul d have done,
but   gave l ess encouragem ent  t o short - t erm  over- product i on f r om  l ong-l i ved t r ee crops t han
r ental cont r acts w oul d have done.  Shar ecroppi ng cont r acts also had t he advant age of21
r em ovi ng  f r om   l andl ords  t he  necessit y  of    esti ma t i ng  t he  opt i ma l   r ent  t o  charge  –  som ethi ng
t hat   w oul d have been di f f i cult ,   gi ven t he l arge vari ati ons i n out put   l evels across i ndi vi dual
poderi .
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